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REFORM TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN CHILE:
EVALUATION AND CHALLENGES
Rafael Blanco
Richard Hutttt
Hugo Rojasttt
I. Introduction
On December 31, 1894, President Jorge Montt (1891-1896) sent a bill to the
Chilean National Congress proposing a new Code of Criminal Procedure.' At
that time he apologized for the content of the bill. He openly admitted that it was
a bad bill, but he urged its passage despite its shortcomings. The Criminal Proce-
dure Code ("C6digo de Procedimiento Penal") entered into force in 1907, keep-
ing alive the old inquisitorial system.2 In this article, we do not pretend to
explain what happened between 1907 and 2000 (when the criminal reform started
as a pilot program in two of the thirteen regions that form Chile). To get a good
perception of the frustrations that the Chilean society had with the judiciary - the
lack of the court's independence, the obstacles to due process of law at all levels,
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and local courts, the corruption in the judicial
system, and other symptoms of the crisis - it is enough to consult with El Libro
Negro de la Justicia en Chile (1999), a book prepared by journalist Alejandra
Matus (and prohibited for some time). 3
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1 Ximena Hassi Thumala, El mensaje del presidente Montt, CRONICA, Aug. 14, 2003, at http://www.
cronica.cl/edicioncronica/seccion/articulo.php3?id=7070 (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
2 Id.
3 It took six years for journalist Alejandra Matus to re-collect the information associated with the
crisis of the judiciary and presented in EL LIBRO NEGRO DE LA JUSTICIA EN CHILE (Planeta, 1st ed. 1999),
also available at http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/libroslnegro/index.html (last visited Apr. 15,
2005). On the same day that the book was placed in bookstores (Apr. 14, 1999), former President of the
Supreme Court, Judge Servando Jordan, filed a suit against Matus before the Santiago Appeals Court,
invoking Article 6(b) of the State Security Law (Ley de Seguridad Interior del Estado) which makes
insulting high authorities a crime. Appeals Court Judge, Rafael Huerta also initiated a prosecution
against Matus, and ordered the seizure of the entire press run of the book. The editor and the manager of
Editorial Planeta, publisher of her book, were detained and all copies of the book were confiscated and
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In the '90s, during the period called Transition to Democracy ("Transici6n a la
Democracia"), a movement of intellectuals and professors re-started the debate
which had been interrupted by the dictatorship between 1973 and 1990. This
debate found common ground in the insistence that the judiciary had to be re-
formed, especially in the area of criminal justice. There was widespread dissatis-
faction with the passivity of the judiciary during the dictatorship when there was
absolutely no protection for the most basic human rights.
4
In this article, we will explore the process of legal reform which has begun to
transform the administration of justice in Chile. Responding to a long-standing
urge to reform, and after several years of negotiations, the reformation of the
code of criminal justice began in earnest on December 16, 2000, in the form of
pilot programs in several regions throughout the country. 5 These pilot programs
provide a unique opportunity to test the new process. In June of 2005, this period
of reformation will culminate in its application in Chile's largest city, Santiago.
6
How well this reformation works in Santiago will have profound implications on
its continuing application throughout Chile. This transformation is a complete
paradigm shift and can be understood as almost revolutionary. It will produce
significant change both institutionally and culturally. It will be observed closely
throughout Latin American and may well provide a useful model and guide for
judicial reform for other countries in the region.7
II. Characteristics of the Process of Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile
The old Chilean system was inherited from Spain during the initial coloniza-
tion. It was inquisitorial in form, by which the functions of investigation, prose-
cution, and judgment were all carried out by one institution: the judiciary. This
banned. Matus received political asylum in the United States in February of 2000. After a period of time
as a reporter for the "Nuevo Herald" (Miami, Fla.), she received a grant from the Ford Foundation to
write EL LIBRo BLANCO DE LA JUSTICIA (2002). She currently works as editor-in-chief of "Plan B" in
Santiago. For further information, see Alejandra Matus, Symposium On The Role Of A Free Press And
Freedom Of Expression In The Development And Consolidation Of Democracy In Latin America: The
Black Book of Chilean Justice, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 329 (2002).
4 See generally INFORME DE LA COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE VERDAD, JUSTICIA Y RECONCILIACION
(2001), at http://www.monografias.com/trabajosl4/comision-verdad/comision-verdad.shtml (last visited
Apr. 15, 2005); INFORME DE LA COMISION NACIONAL SOBRE PRISI6N POLtICA Y TORTURA (2004), at
http://www.presidencia.cl/view/viewlnformeTortura.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). For a political ex-
planation of the different Latin American phenomena that concerned the political actors in the '90s, see
generally, Tom Farer, Consolidating Democracy in Latin America: Law, Legal Institutions and Constitu-
tional Structure, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1295 (1995).
5 ANTONIO MARANGUNIC AND TODD FOGLESONG, CHARTING JUSTICE REFORM IN CHILE: A COMPAR-
ISON OF THE OLD AND NEW SYSTEMS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, VEAA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1 (Dec.
2004) [hereinafter VERA INSTITUTE REPORT].
6 Id. According to the 2002 Census, Santiago has a population of 5,875,013 out of a total national
population of 15,116,435. For more information, see http://www.ine.cI/cd2002/index.php.
7 In case of special interest in the challenges for Latin America in the administration of justice, see
generally, Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos, The Vision for Reform and its Potential for Success, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 239 (2004).
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was true throughout all of Latin America, but Chile adhered to an "orthodox"
inquisitorial model. 8
A hallmark of the inquisitorial system was the fact that it was, for the most
part, a written system. Investigation was assigned to low level functionaries,
many of whom had absolutely no training in the law. There was little or no
contact between the parties and between the parties and the judge. Cases could,
and did, linger for years. Because of these factors, most cases were appealed,
making final decisions even more distant.
The inability to present clear and objective policy to law enforcement agencies
resulted in a lack of professionalism among the police, which in turn contributed
to a culture of corruption and abuse.9
By the end of the last century, most Latin American countries had moved into
some form of mixed inquisitorial and adversarial system. After the period of
transition, which began in 2000, Chile will have a completely adversarial
system.l°
In this section, we will explore the main characteristics of the new system of
criminal procedure: (a) radical separation between the investigatory and decision
making functions, (b) replacement of the written system with an oral system, (c)
creation of a system for prosecutorial discretion, (d) incorporation of alternative
forms of dispute resolution within the criminal system, and (e) creation of the
guarantee judge and the three oral judge panels."I
A. A radical separation between the investigatory and decision making
functions
The new system totally separates the prosecutorial from the decision making
process. The Public Ministry was created, with constitutional autonomy, to take
on prosecutorial duties.12 This agency was created to resolve issues of impartial-
ity and objectivity within the area of criminal investigation. It has also tended to
reduce bureaucracy and professionalize police activity.
The "Poder Judicial," literally, Judicial Power, was reformed to do what the
judiciary should do, namely to judge, unencumbered by the requirements of in-
vestigation and prosecution.
8 Patrick Cooper, The New Criminal Justice in Chile, Address at the International Association of
Prosecutors, 9th Annual Conference (Sep. 7, 2004), at http://www.iap.nl.com/speeches-conference-seoul
_2004/newcriminal.justice-in chilejby-patrick-cooper.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
9 See generally Cooper, supra note 8.
10 VERA INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
II In this document we do not pretend to offer a general description of the new system. For that, see
generally, Carlos Rodrigo de la Barra Cousifio, Chile: Adversarial vs. Inquisitorial Systems: The Rule of
Law and Prospects for Criminal Procedure Reform in Chile, 5 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 323 (1998).
12 See CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA, ch. VI-A. See also, Ley Org~inica Constitucional
del Ministerio P6blico, Law 19.640, (1999) (Chile). For further information, see generally, http://www.
minpublico.cl (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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The judicial reform establishes two new types of judges. 13 The first are called
Guarantee Judges ("Jueces de Garantfa") referring to their role in guaranteeing
due process. The guarantee judges review the evidence throughout the course of
the prosecution. They can take guilty pleas and preside over trials. The second
type of judges are those who hear oral arguments ("Tribunal Oral en lo Penal").
Oral arguments are trials similar to the trials before guarantee judges. The differ-
ence here is that there is a panel of three judges who hear the case. Their deci-
sion does not have to be unanimous. The decision as to whether to have a trial
before a guarantee judge or an oral argument lies in the hands of the accused.
A system of public defenders was also created.' 4 The public defender, estab-
lished on a national level with regional offices, is charged with the legal defense
of the poor. Beyond this, of course, is its role as one of the foundations of the
adversarial system. The public defenders are augmented by a public system of
contract attorneys ("licitaciones pdblicas"). A public announcement is made, by
newspaper, soliciting proposals for private attorneys to accept a set of future
criminal cases. Responses are evaluated by the public defender. Criteria used
for these selections include: the number of attorneys in the particular office, their
experience and qualifications, previous cases, administrative support within their
office, and generally, their level of professionalism. The assignments are subject
to regular review and oversight and effectiveness is evaluated by observation at
trial and inspection of files. An attorney can be precluded from accepting further
solicitations due to failure to meet these standards.
B. Replacement of the written system with an oral system
The system in which litigation is reduced to written complaints and answers
has deep roots within Latin American legal systems. While all of the legal sys-
tems have attempted some form of modification, the written system seems to find
ways to revive itself. Sometimes it finds expression in the oral presentation of
written material. But the commitment to a system of oral argument is essential
for the success of judicial reform and especially the reformation of criminal jus-
tice. The requirement for written material slows the process, places barriers be-
tween the parties and the judges, and ritualizes the proceedings. Oral argument,
on the other hand, infuses the hearing with a sense of dynamism. It permits free
and open debate and allows the judge or judges to require clear and logical
presentations on both sides. This, in turn, allows the judges to make decisions
based on cogent facts, which promotes respect not only for the final decision, but
for the judicial system as a whole, while also protecting the interests of the
accused.
All of this presupposes a well-structured trial with careful and thorough prepa-
ration, clear presentation, fair decision making throughout the trial, and just reso-
lution of the conflict. This complex dynamic can be undermined at any point
13 See generally C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL (2000) (Chile) [hereinafter CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL].
For further information, see generally, http://www.poderjudicial.cl (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
14 See Reglamento Licitaciones Defensa Penal Ptiblica, Law 19.718 (2001) (Chile). For further in-
formation, see generally, http://www.defensoriapenal.cl/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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without proper legal foundation and continuing education. Educational modali-
ties including role-playing, trial simulation, and advocacy training must be pro-
vided for judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys as they practice in this new
system.
C. Creation of a system for prosecutorial discretion
A further modification is the area of prosecutorial discretion. It can be as-
sumed that no criminal investigation is 100% accurate or that there might be
other reasons for prosecutors to decide not to prosecute a particular case. Some
criteria have been set up to guide prosecutors as they determine how to proceed
on a case. Over time, it is hoped that these criteria will evolve out of an open and
public debate of this issue.
Chilean prosecutors can elect not to proceed on a case based on the following:
1. Either no crime was committed or the statute of limitations has ex-
pired. In a case such as this, the victim can ask a superior in the office of
the Public Ministry ("Fiscal Regional" or "Fiscal Nacional") to review
the prosecutor's decision, and ultimately a guarantee judge can make the
final decision.
2. When there is insufficient evidence to continue the investigation. In
this case, the investigative material is placed in an archive which can be
re-opened in light of new evidence. As in the first case, this decision can
be reviewed by a higher level prosecutor, and ultimately can be heard by
a guarantee judge.
3. When it is not in the public interest to prosecute, in other words,
there is what is termed "relevant evidence" of a crime, but the prosecutor
chooses not to proceed. This decision is limited to minor crimes, carrying
sentences of less than eighteen months imprisonment, and is not available
in the prosecution of public officials accused of official wrongdoing. 15
These forms of prosecutorial discretion are important in the new system be-
cause the allocation of resources is always a consideration. Yet, the potential for
abuse is curtailed through the selectivity exercised by the prosecutors and review
and revision of discretionary decisions.
D. Incorporation of alternative forms of dispute resolution within the
criminal system
Another aspect of the new system, which is distinctive to the Chilean process,
is the institution of alternative forms of dispute resolution.16 These alternatives
suspend the proceedings while some sort of economic resolution between the
parties can be reached, or an agreement between the defendant and the prosecutor
can be reached. In regards to criminal matters, this practice is known as Condi-
15 C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13. For an analysis of prosecutorial discretion in the Chil-
ean system, see Cousiflo, supra note 11, at 338-346.
16 CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, tit. V, para. 6.
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tional Suspension of Proceedings ("suspensi6n condicional del procedimiento")
in which the prosecutor and the accused reach an agreement to end the prosecu-
tion. This is available for lesser crimes, which carry sentences of less than three
years and require that the defendant have no previous criminal history. In effect,
the Chilean judicial reform amplified the term "criminal justice" by recognizing
the state's power to prosecute, while at the same time contemplating ways of
reducing re-offending and re-victimization. Some of the conditions which can be
part of the agreement could include:
1. That the defendant reside in a specific location;
2. That the defendant avoid certain specific persons or locations;
3. That the defendant submit to psychological or medical treatment;
4. That the defendant have either a job or be enrolled in some type of
educational program;
5. That the defendant pay restitution to the victim;
6. That the defendant report to the Ministry of Justice periodically; and
7. That the defendant have a fixed residence and inform the Ministry of
Justice when he moves.17
These conditions, which are agreed to by the defendant and the prosecutor, are
then presented to a guarantee judge for ratification and are formally entered as an
order of the court.
Another form of alternate dispute resolution is restitution ("acuerdo
reparatorio"), which usually is available for property crimes and less serious of-
fenses.' 8 These types of negotiations can be done between the offender and the
victim, but they must be ratified by a guarantee judge, and the prosecutor can
oppose such agreements as not being in the public interest.
Many of these types of agreements have the characteristics of "Restorative
Justice" because they are agreements between the victim and the offender in
which both can relate to the other's life experience, while at the same time reduc-
ing excuses often made by offenders.' 9
Finally, there is a third type of alternative dispute resolution which is some-
what different from the other two. It is the North American system of "plea
bargaining" and consists of negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense
attorney in which each suggests a possible sentence. 20 This usually involves
crimes carrying sentences of less than five years incarceration. All of this as-
sumes a complete disclosure of evidence. The final agreement must be taken to a
guarantee judge who has final control over the sentence and who also reviews the
evidence.
17 Id.
18 C6ODIO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 2, tit. I, para. 6.
19 See generally Rafael Blanco et al. Justicia Restaurativa: marco te6rico, experiencias comparadas
y propuestas de polftica pdblica, in COl-ECC1ON DE INVESTIGACIONES JURfDICAS UNIVERSIDAD ALBERTO
HURTADO (2004) (proposing the use of "suspensiones condicionales del procedimiento" and "acuerdos
reparatorios" as practical mechanisms to promote restorative justice in the Chilean legal culture).
20 CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, tit. V, para. 6.
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E. Creation of the guarantee judge and the three oral judge panels
Finally the complaint is brought by the prosecutor to a guarantee judge who
will determine the evidence that can be presented in the oral, adversarial trial in
front of the three judge panel. 21 It will feature direct examination following the
rules of evidence, cross examination, and careful observation of the presentation
of evidence by both sides. The trial itself is controlled by the presiding judge
who follows the rules of procedure, and resolves, with his or her peers, the objec-
tions entered by the parties during the examinations and cross examinations. The
judge also enforces the rules of evidence and rules regarding the manner in which
witnesses are questioned. 22
Crimes of a less serious nature are tried before an impartial judge. To question
a sentence, whether it is a misapplication of the law or violates due process, the
defendant has recourse to the Court of Appeals and ultimately to the Supreme
Court. Either of these could send the case back to a three judge panel, but a
different panel from the one which originally heard the case.
23
IlI. On the road to reforming the criminal justice system - Where are
we now?
In this section we will explore where we are on the road to a new system of
criminal justice, and what we have experienced, in order to show evidence of
achievements and successes in this reformation. The distinct elements on the
scene at the moment can be summarized as follows:
A. The application of the reform as a system of pilot programs and gradual
application
The reform process in Chile differed from similar processes in other Latin
American countries in that it was not applied simultaneously throughout the en-
tire country. On the contrary, a decision was made to begin the program in two
regions, one in the north (Second Region of Antofagasta) and the other in the
south (Ninth region of La Araucanfa). The idea was to test the new process in an
environment that could be controlled and monitored, identifying problems as
they arose. This would allow for time and flexibility to adjust problems before
beginning the process in other areas. Given that these changes had an impact on
the normal routines and practices, for example, the creation of the Public Minis-
try, it was imperative to study the effect on the various agencies, both new and
existing, in the system. The strength of the plan was in its ability for prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges to work at an inter-agency level doing simulations
to see how trials would be conducted in the new system.
The regions selected for the first stage were chosen based on the following
criteria:
21 C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 2, tits. I-III.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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1. Regions in which the legal community clearly expressed a desire to
assume this responsibility;
2. The existence of active law schools in the regions;
3. A homogeneous level of criminal activity, that is, that the distribution
of crime followed general categories without too wide a variance that
could distort the sample; 24
4. Urban areas with concentrated population centers (Antofagasta and
Calama in the north, Temuco and Villarrica in the south); and
5. Regions having a level of technological development and information
services sufficient to test the new technologies that would be associated
with the reform.
The idea was to have a high level of supervision and control over problems
that would arise during the entire process. It was necessary to recognize new
practices which would naturally develop and prove to be central to the new sys-
tem. It was also important to give the participants in the process a sense of
responsibility and ownership, as well as control over the inevitable tension that
develops in periods of voluntary change.
Almost all of the other Latin American countries have chosen to impose judi-
cial reform throughout the country at one time, or have considered it prudent to
follow a more gradual development. Such is the case in Venezuela and Paraguay
which chose to apply their reforms gradually, either developing new rules of
investigation and prosecution and then going on to change the role of the judici-
ary, or opting first to change the role of the judge, and then modifying the Code
of Procedure.
B. Beginning the reform without transferring old cases to the new system
Another aspect to consider in the Chilean experience is the fact that the pro-
cess began to work without taking on cases which had already been filed in the
old system. It was easier for the prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges to
proceed without the baggage of the older system, which, for example, had a
method of case distribution that slowed the process. Also, the old system did not
permit the prosecutorial discretion that the new system allows. It was important
for the players to assume their own method of administration during this "gesta-
tion period."
Another very helpful tool was a computer program that analyzed statistical
data about cases in the test regions, allowing the agencies to anticipate workload,
length of time for specific trials, and the length of time for investigation. The
data allowed the agencies to determine just how many prosecutors, defense attor-
24 In the case of the Ninth Region, indigenous law experts criticized the selection of La Araucanfa for
the pilot program because of the so called "mapuche conflict" related to land ownership and cultural
recognition of the indigenous communities and peoples. See generally INSTIrruTO DE ESTUlDOS IN-
DIGENAS UNIVERSIDAD DE LA FRONTERA, INFORME SOBRE LA SITUAcION DE LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO
MAPUCHE, 35-41 (2002), at http://www.iipm-mpri.org/biblioteca/docs/informe%20final%20pdi%20
mapuche.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); but cf Danko Jaccard, Conflicto mapuche y refonna procesal
penal: una mirada critica (2004) at http://www.derechosindigenas.cl/Actualidad/documentos/CON-
FLICTOMAPUCHEYREFORMAPROCESALPENAL.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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neys, and judges would be needed to complete cases within a reasonable amount
of time, as well as to calculate the possible number of cases that could be com-
pleted within the year that the test system would be working.
25
C. The design and redesign of critical processes
Another factor that assisted the smooth application of the new system related
to studies which focused on designing administrative practices providing the best
way to reach strategic goals. Economic studies as well as sociological studies
provided a framework not only for later evaluation of the process, but also for
anticipating what the agencies might expect in the face of the goals and expecta-
tions of the new system.
26
D. Successful training and legal research
A critical element in this process was preparing and applying training modali-
ties. Initially there was not a lot of confidence within the agencies that they
would be able to create new processes on their own, and there was also a low
expectation that the legal system itself could change in any significant manner.
So it became necessary to design training that focused on the inherent strengths
in the system, such as oral presentation, open access to courts, and relative speed
of resolution.2 7
The actual training consisted of trial simulations in which the prosecutors, de-
fense attorneys, and judges were able to experience the interactions that arose in
each type of case. It was important to be able to clarify and develop the type of
information and skills needed to confront each step of the new process. At the
same time, this process was monitored by the academic world. 28
In addition, the impressive number of monographs written by the legal actors
that are participating in the judicial reform shows the magnitude of interest and
commitment to the success of the reform.2 9
25 Several studies were conducted by the Ministry of Justice, CEJA, Pontificia Universidad Cat6lica
de Valparafso, Universidad Diego Portales, Universidad de Chile, and Universidad Alberto Hurtado,
between 1998 and 2002.
26 For a better appreciation of the relation between goals, resources and the criminal reform in Chile,
see generally Alejandro Vera Quilodrdn, Transparencia y Reforma Procesal en Chile (2004), available
at http://www.dplf.org/CS/span/mx-csO3/mx_csO3_vera.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
27 The most recognized programs are offered by Academia Judicial, Universidad de Chile, Univer-
sidad Diego Portales School of Law and Universidad Alberto Hurtado School of Law. Professors Mauri-
cio Duce, Cristidn Riego, Andrrs Baytelman, Hector Hermndez, Rafael Blanco, Mauricio Decap, Angel
Valencia, Maria In~s Horvitz, Cristidn Bofill, Radil Tavolari, Leonardo Moreno, Antonio Ulloa, Mirtha
Ulloa, among others, deserve much credit for the quality of the training processes.
28 See generally ANDRES BAYTELMAN AND MAURIcIO DUCE, EVALUACION DE LA REFORMA
PROCESAL PENAL: ESTADO DE UNA REFORMA EN MARCHA, (2003), available at http://www.cejamericas.
org/doc/proyectos/eval-rpp-chile2.zip [hereinafter BAYTELMAN & DucE].
29 See generally MINISTERIO PUBLICO, EVALUACION DEL TRABAJO DE LOS FISCALES ADJUNTOS DEL
MINISTERIO POBLiCO, BOLETfN DE JURISPRUDENCIA, No. 11 (July 2002).
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E. Generating a higher level of consensus among different political views
The final, and perhaps most important factor, is a sustained political commit-
ment to the reform movement. It is necessary to collectively develop the re-
sources for information gathering, training, monitoring, evaluating, and
modifying the process. Reform of this magnitude requires leadership; but be-
yond this, it requires a high level of political support and consensus as problems
arise and adjustments are required.30
IV. Evaluation of the Reform Process
The process of criminal justice reform, as in the case of all political processes,
requires periods of evaluation which permit modifications and changes in both
strategic planning and day-to-day systemic operation. The idea is to identify ad-
vances and successes, as well as challenges, as the process moves onward. In-
deed, all such political processes must pass the test of public scrutiny as well as
being tested by political scientists and economists. During this period, the ad-
ministration of President Eduardo Frei and the current administration of President
Ricardo Lagos have closely followed the reformation of the Code of Criminal
Justice. 3 ' At the same time, there have been ongoing studies by universities and
private organizations that have contributed immensely to both a financial and
political understanding of the entire process. 32 These studies have identified sig-
nificant successes in this process in the following areas: (a) transparency; (b)
speed; (c) contact; (d) orality; (e) due process; (f) impartiality; (g) protection; and
(h) professionalism.
A. A greater transparency in the criminal justice system
The reform process has permitted the elimination of the well known practice
of not divulging the findings of criminal courts, which impeded access to infor-
mation. The availability of information often depended on buying information or
press leaks. 33 In the new system, everything is publicized and can be read.34
Victims, people filing law suits, prosecutors, and defense attorneys all have ac-
cess to the files. All phases of trials are open to the public. The judges are
known and the doors of the courtroom are always open. People are free to enter
30 The leadership of the former Minister of Justice, Soledad Alvear, the former President of the
Supreme Court, Mario Garrido, and strong institutions such as Corporaci6n de Promoci6n Universitaria,
Fundaci6n Paz Ciudadana, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Fundaci6n
Konrad Adenauer, the Embassy of the United States of America, the Embassy of Germany, El Mercurio,
among others, supported the previous stages of the reform, allowing policy makers to spread the dis-
course of the need of a total change inside the judiciary.
31 For a congressionally mandated Report of the Comisi6n of Experts, see Documento de la comisi6n
nombrada para revisar y evaluar la marcha y functionamiento del nuevo sistema de enjuiciamiento
criminal, available at http://www.pazciudadana.cl/documentoslinformecomisionevaluacion2003.pdf (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005).
32 See generally BAYTELMAN & DucE, supra note 28.
33 Cooper, supra note 8 (regarding the use of bribery for access to the judicial system in general).
34 C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, tit. I, paras. 2-4.
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and leave without difficulty. It is not possible to find this level of publicity in
any other country in South America, according to comparative studies provided
by the Justice Studies Center of the Americas (CEJA). 35 These studies show that
in other countries the public is not able to enter courtrooms while court is in
session without specific permission. It is even difficult to find out who is in
charge or who is working so hard to guard all of this information. The level of
public access of the new system is such that the press has access to the proceed-
ings, which will eliminate the practice of buying and selling information and
relying on press leaks.
B. A higher level of speed in the process
One of the aspects of the reform that really must be developed and protected is
the relative speed of decision making and closing cases. Studies provided by
Universidad Diego Portales show that the average duration of a robbery prosecu-
tion in Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX (Temuco) was 3.3 months and 1.3 months
in Regions II (Antofagasta), III (Atacama), and VII (Maule). A prosecution for
theft cases took 2.5 months in Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX (Temuco), and 1.1
months in Regions II (Antofagasta), III (Atacama), and VII (Maule). In homi-
cide cases, the figures showed that the duration was generally 3.3 months in
Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX (Temuco), and 3.7 months in Regions II (Antofa-
gasta), III (Atacama), and VII (Maule). These figures included cases under in-
vestigation and cases proceeding under the system of prosecutorial discretion. If
cases of prosecutorial discretion are deducted, the times increase. However,
these figures are still valuable for the sake of openness and the allocation of
resources. These figures show that in robbery cases the duration of the case
averages 7.7 months if Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX (Temuco), and 3.2
months in Regions II (Antofagasta), III (Atacama), and VII (Maule). Theft cases
average 5.2 months in Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX (Temuco) and 2.3 months
in Regions II (Antofagasta), III (Atacama), and VII (Maule). Trying a homicide
case took, on the average, 10.4 months in Regions IV (Coquimbo) and IX
(Temuco), and 4.0 months in Regions II (Antofagasta), 11 (Atacama), and VII
(Maule). These figures contrast markedly with the inquisitional system which in
general averaged 3.5 years for a criminal case. 36
C. Direct contact with the judge
A marked positive change of the reform was the disappearance of in-
termediaries between the parties and the judge, which was the general rule under
35 See generally Jurisprudencia de juicios orales en materia de delitos sexuales, available at http://
www.cejamericas.org/doc/proyectos/cl-jurisprudencia-del-sexuales.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Con-
struccidn de Herramientas de un sistema de informacidn de Estadisticas Judiciales: Aspectos Generales:
Para responder a los por qug y para qui de las estadisticas judiciales, at http://www.cejamericas.org/
doc/documentos/gimenez-ppt-construccion.pps (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
36 This information has been shared by professors of Universidad Diego Portales at the Comitd de
Expertos del Ministerio de Justicia de ]a Reforma Procesal Penal, and Comit6 de Expertos del Ministerio
del Interior sobre Seguridad Ciudadana. For statistical information and results, see generally
BAYTELMAN & DUCE, supra note 28.
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the old system. Now, the actuario is a figure who is no longer on the scene,
having been replaced by direct contact between the judge and the victim, the
accused and the respective attorneys. This type of contact allows the judge(s) to
hear the case from its beginning through its resolution. This completely elimi-
nates the problems that were prevalent in the old system of corrupt actuarios and
bailiffs who obtained favors. Under the reform, all decisions are made by judges
in the presence of the parties. 37
D. The replacement of the written system with an oral system
Another aspect which merits discussion is the effective replacement of a sys-
tem relying on written pleadings to one in which oral argument is the method of
advocacy. The new trials are entirely oral and the final decision is made on the
basis of evaluating the evidence presented orally. There is even a system of
recording the proceedings, whereby the entire trial is recorded onto a CD and
made available to all attorneys.
E. Increasing the guarantees of due process for all parties in the proceedings
By providing impartiality to the judiciary, oral trials, immediate access to the
judge, and speed to the proceedings, the reform increases the rights of all parties
involved in the criminal process, especially those accused by the state. These
rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to a speedy trial, the right
to a quality defense for those without means to hire an attorney, the right to
confront witnesses and evidence, and the right to an honest judge. 38
F. An impartial judge
One of the major successes of the reform is the replacement of a system in
which the judge investigates, prosecutes and decides the case with one in which
the prosecutorial function is placed in the hands of an administrative agency.
The judge now has the function of guaranteeing the protection of due process and
thus can decide the case objectively rather than subjectively. 39
G. Improvement of programs to protect victims and witnesses
Yet another aspect which merits discussion is the treatment the new system
affords victims and witnesses; namely the protection and attention offered to
them during and after the trial. The inquisitorial system traditionally lacked any
type of assistance for victims of crimes or witnesses which gave little incentive
for them to testify. In the new system, there are organizations in addition to the
37 See generally Luz Estella Nagle, Latin America in the Twenty-First Century: The Cinderella of
Government: Judicial Reform in Latin America, 30 CAL. W. htr'L L.J. 345 (2000) (commenting on the
opportunities of judicial corruption in Latin America, including Chile). See generally MINISTERIO DE
JUSTICIA ET AL, ANUARIO ESTADfSTICO INTERINSTITUCIONAL REFORMA PROCESAL PENAL 2004 (2005),
available at http://www.pazciudadana.cl/documentos/Anuario_202004-20(RPP).pdf.
38 C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, tit. VI, para. 4.
39 C6DIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, et. seq.
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Public Ministry that accompany victims and witnesses to court and provide psy-
chological support as well. Other methods of protection are also available such
as "panic buttons," cell phones, police protection for the home, and even witness
re-location.40
H. The professionalism of the police 4
The final aspect to be mentioned in the process of reform is the higher level of
professionalism required among the police. This is intimately linked with the
formation of the Public Ministry, which is devoted to criminal investigation.
This agency articulates various interests of law enforcement and promotes stan-
dards within the bounds of the criminal justice system. Because of this, the po-
lice, along with their counterparts in the fields of forensic sciences, will be solely
dedicated to the investigation and solving of crime. The results will aid the pros-
ecutors to make decisions to prosecute, suggest sentences, or to dismiss the case.
In this new scenario, in which defense counsel can vigorously question the
evidence provided by the police, there will be a heightened dedication on the part
of law enforcement to investigate carefully, which will lead to less mishandling
or manipulating of evidence throughout the course of an investigation.
V. Challenges to the Reform Process
The following section identifies some problems in the reform process which
will act as important challenges to overcome for a successful application in the
Metropolitan Region (Santiago).
A. A greater investment in sensitizing and educating the citizenry
All public policy ought to be applied taking into account the connection be-
tween the rights and obligations of the citizens. If the people are not permitted an
active role in the design, evaluation, and application of a particular policy it will
undermine its level of legitimacy and acceptance. The reform was marked, from
the beginning, by a highly inclusive and participatory process which gave an
ample base for approval, both politically and technically.42
Actually, the origin of this project went back to the work carried out by the
civic society. The Corporation for University Promotion ("Corporaci6n de
Promoci6n Universitaria"), a study center linked to the political parties that com-
pose the coalition "Concertaci6n de Partidos por la Democracia" (ruling in the
government since 1990) created a canvas with which to craft the reform. Under
this umbrella of ideas, the matrix of the reform was created by a group of intel-
lectuals from different universities, which became the draft for the new Code of
Criminal Procedure. Subsequently, the Foundation for Citizenry Peace ("Funda-
ci6n Paz Ciudadana"), representing a link to the political right ("Renovaci6n Na-
40 CODIGO PROCESAL PENAL, supra note 13, at bk. 1, tit. VI, para. 2.
41 By police, we include Policta de Investigaciones and Carabineros de Chile.
42 VERA INSTITUTE REPORT, supra note 5, at I.
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cional" and "Uni6n de Dem6cratas Independientes"), and more importantly, a
link to El Mercurio, the most influential written news outlet in the country, joined
in the task.43 This fortunate "joint venture" by both sides was augmented in the
public sector by the Ministry of Justice which gave its approval from the onset.
44
This strategic alliance made the government of Eduardo Frei confident enough
to send the project to Parliament. However, Parliament decided to make some
room for debate, and created Forum for the Reform of Criminal Procedure ("Foro
de la Reforma Procesal Penal"), headed by the Minister of Justice and comprise
of private attorneys, professors from several universities, representatives from the
political sector, and other public and private institutions. This forum debated the
project on a more technical level where the project was critically examined and
modified until finally given life in the text form which was sent to the commis-
sions of the National Congress. During the legislative process, which took more
than four years of negotiation, many academic institutions, public organizations,
judges, and prosecutors from other countries were heard.45
The hearings generated a large amount of publicity and debate, however it was
recognized that the project was begun in a closed setting without public participa-
tion which would become significantly important when the reform was to be
applied and evaluated.
As has been suggested previously, a large part of the legitimacy of the entire
justice system, and therefore the reform process, depends upon the support of the
people and must be evaluated with the good judgment of the citizens as the insti-
tutions are formed. In part this is simply a requirement of democracy, but it is
even more imperative when this type of paradigm change is contemplated in
which the entire system is being reformed. There are not simply new rules, but
new practices, new skill requirements, new relations between citizens and the
personnel of the new system; in fact it requires a new cultural vision of the crimi-
nal justice system. Therefore, the government needs to hold public hearings in
Santiago before full implementation of the reform.
Finally, information is required for citizens to utilize the new services of the
justice system. To choose from the options provided by an open system, to legit-
imately demand to exercise rights, and to submit to the obligations inherent in a
criminal justice system, requires information from the beginning and throughout
the process.
43 With the sponsorship of the most prominent and wealthiest entrepreneurs of Chile, Fundaci6n Paz
Ciudadana was created in 1992 (after the negotiation of the liberation of Cristidn Edwards, son of Agus-
tfn Edwards, by the revolutionary movement Frente Patri6tico Manuel Rodrfguez). For more information
related to Fundaci6n Paz Ciudadana's efforts to prevent and repress delinquency in Chile, see http://
wvww.paziudadana.cl/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
44 See generally The Ministry of Justice website, at http://www.minjusticia.cU (last visited Apr. 15,
2005).
45 See generally Nagle, supra note 37 (regarding the cooperative spirit of judicial reform in develop-
ing countries in Latin America).
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B. Overcoming the false dilemma between efficiency and due process as
irreconcilable in the new criminal process
The reform has created a special agency for prosecution, known as the Public
Ministry, which has as its function the organization and direction of criminal
investigation, the creation of law enforcement policies, the protection of victims
and witnesses and the representation of the public in the criminal system. This
agency has developed specialized units for different types of crimes, such as
money laundering, narcotics and corruption, as well as units devoted to solving
sexual crimes and property crimes. This is the first time in Chilean history that
such an agency exists for this purpose. Upon this foundation, sophisticated strat-
egies for dealing with crime can be developed with improved resources. The
police can form strategic alliances within the community. All of this can be
accomplished without the slightest abrogation of the rights of due process.46 In
fact, because the Public Ministry provides an objective context and sets limits,
there will be more control over police work in general.
C. Tension between judicial function and financial pressures
Another problem which confronts the process of reform is the manner of ad-
ministrative organization for the flow of cases into courtrooms. It is important
that the reform includes a reorganization of the judicial branch which presup-
poses the professionalization of court administration. There is envisioned a court
administrator charged with such jobs as scheduling cases and receiving witnesses
and experts. This type of administrator can enable the courts to function
efficiently.
The one person courtroom is designed to be an economic approach for the use
of human and financial resources. The traditional system had many local rules
and regulations which impeded efficient scheduling of hearings. It must not be
forgotten that the central idea in the new system of criminal justice is precisely
that the work of the judges is to conduct trials in which the complaints and needs
of the litigants are recognized and where decisions are made in their presence.
Under the new system, judges are not responsible for playing an investigative or
prosecutorial role.
This level of transparency and immediate contact between the judge and the
parties, will depend, in part, on the administrative capacity to develop procedures
which highlight the courtroom as the seat of decision making. One of the jobs of
the court administrators will be to reform the old court regulations which varied
from courthouse to courthouse, having been promulgated by individual judges.
In the new courthouses, administrative functions will be modified sensibly in
order to free judges from purely administrative duties so that they can focus their
time and energy on matters genuinely judicial.
Given the intense work in these courthouses, it is necessary that the prosecu-
tor's office develop efficient procedures, especially case distribution among pros-
46 See Mauricio Duce, La reforma procesal penal en Chile, gbuenas noticias para los derechos de
imputado? (1998), available at http://www.dplf.org/Conference98/Duce.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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ecutors. The idea of a case associated with one prosecutor should be abandoned.
Instead, the prosecutors should have attorneys dedicated to the selection and
screening of cases, and others who do courtroom litigation. This model is in
operation in some prosecutor's offices already and should be expanded through-
out the country.
D. Control over the risk of the return of the inquisitorial system
Another challenge for the new system will be the permanent necessity to de-
velop a monitoring system for the reform, a way of setting up an early warning
system for possible problems, bad practices or interpretation and application of
norms contrary to the objectives of the new system of justice.
Some of the problematic practices which have been occasionally detected
were in relation to the presentation of the papers which come into oral trials,
which were merely recopies of the investigation. Slowly, the practice evolved so
that it was possible to conduct an oral trial with what were termed "relevant
papers," destroying the idea of an oral trial. The whole concept of oral trial is to
replace paper with live witnesses and present experts who can be deposed. None
of this can be sustained with a written system. In order to avoid the proliferation
of paper, the Code should be revised to capitalize on the capability of the oral
system to present evidence, present witnesses and to do so entirely without writ-
ten declaration.
E. The elaboration of a doctrine which successfully protects rights and
guarantees, with a minimum of bureaucracy
In effect, the new Code has a system of norms which provide adequate time
and space for legal activity, judicial determination, and court administration. All
parties are able to develop reasonable standards to measure policy regarding the
rights and guarantees of the defendants, standards of proof and standards related
with the verdicts in oral trials, among other aspects. Then, the legal actors must
develop a balance between the work that will be required by the state agents and
the demands of legal efficiency.
VI. Conclusions
The preceding evaluation can be seen as providing a possible vision of mea-
suring the level of success seen in the new model of justice in Chile, as well as
challenges without ignoring the need to be aware of reverting to traditional in-
quisitorial practices.
Researching comparative judicial reform processes allows us to see that such
changes always confront serious obstacles on the road to completion, and that
some processes have chances of failure. In this article we presented what we
think are the key elements in the Chilean cultural transition from an inquisitorial
to an adversarial system that serve as an example of re-foundational success in
the design of a new administration of justice in a developing country.
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Of course, the transformation requires highly prepared experts in policy mak-
ing, but also politicians from all sectors, well-trained legal actors and a civil
society willing to take the challenges of improving the judiciary, in order to pro-
mote democracy and human rights in a country tired of the abuses committed in
the past.
There are several challenges to attend to in the future. The consolidation of
democracy and the judicial reform in Chile require permanent monitoring, strong
leadership and institutional coordination, but also, and more importantly, the co-
operation and comprehension of the civil society through the different socio-legal
processes that are underway in the thirteen regions of the country as discussed in
this article.
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